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This paper examines factors that influence prices of most common five 
cryptocurrencies such Bitcoin, Ethereum, Dash, Litecoin, and Monero over 2010-
2018 using weekly data. The study employs ARDL technique and documents 
several findings. First, cryptomarket-related factors such as market beta, trading 
volume, and volatility appear to be significant determinant for all five 
cryptocurrencies both in short- and long-run. Second, attractiveness of 
cryptocurrencies also matters in terms of their price determination, but only in 
long-run. This indicates that formation (recognition) of the attractiveness of 
cryptocurrencies are subjected to time factor. In other words, it travels slowly 
within the market. Third, SP500 index seems to have weak positive long-run 
impact on Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litcoin, while its sign turns to negative losing 
significance in short-run, except Bitcoin that generates an estimate of -0.20 at 10% 
significance level. 
Lastly, error-correction models for Bitcoin, Etherem, Dash, Litcoin, and Monero 
show that cointegrated series cannot drift too far apart, and converge to a long-
run equilibrium at a speed of 23.68%, 12.76%, 10.20%, 22.91%, and 14.27% 
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1. Introduction 
Cryptocurrencies have become one of the most trending topics in recent 
economic and financial issues. Since Dotcom crisis, the commerce on internet (e-
commerce) has been rapidly increasing and retail industries have been 
undergoing a revolution as internet sales are booming with more and more tech-
savvy consumers go online to shop. The appetite of stock market investors for e-
commerce shares seemed insatiable as investments on internet retailer were  
massively oversized, despite fears over the future of the Internet after the dotcom 
bubble burst and serious concerns about the safety of online shopping by credit 
cards. Until birth of first cryptocurrency -Bitcoin- in 2009, the online commerce 
was mainly intermediated by financial institutions serving as trusted third parties 
to process electronic payments. Although this system was well enough for most 
transactions, it was working very slowly due to controls of financial institution 
(problem of privacy and trust) and it was somewhat cost (transaction and 
commission costs). 
It triggered emerge of decentralized cryptocurrencies that bypass financial 
controllers, thus, transactions are very fast, smooth, and has zero cost. A 
cryptocurrency is defined as “a digital asset designed to work as a medium of 
exchange using cryptography to secure the transactions and to control the 
creation of additional units of the currency”. First ever use of cryptocurrency in 
online trade was on May 22nd 2010 by Laszlo Hanyecz, a computer programmer 
from Florida, for two pizzas with the amount agreed at 10,000 Bitcoins (Yermack, 
2013), which would be equivalent to $155.80 million today (December 2017). 
In 2017, the popularity and use of cryptocurrencies has increased 
dramatically. People are "investing" vast sums of money into "assets" that have 
no history of producing revenue, and those assets are rising in price only because 
other people are also pouring money into them. Billions of dollars have been 
poured into more than 1,000 new digital coins issued by start-ups in 2017. These 
coins mimic the construction of Bitcoin, meaning they can be freely traded on 
digital exchanges and have no central bank standing behind them. This has raised 
many doubts and questions about current and future of decentralized 
cryptocurrencies. There are two major views. One side argues that it is a bubble 
with no real assets that inevitably will end with burst. The other side opines that 
cryptocurrency markets will become an avenue that will give millions of people an 
opportunity to participate in a global financial network worth tens of trillions of 
dollars. From young millennials in developing nations with small savings and big 
ambitions to mom-and-pop business owners looking to reinvest some profits in 
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promising crypto-projects, these kinds of people will be the backbone of this 
industry.  
This also has increased interest of cryptocurrencies in economics and 
financial research sphere. Although their literature is scant, number of empirical 
research are growing remarkably. In this respect, we also conduct a study that 
examines price influences of cryptocurrencies both in short- and long-run over 
2010-2018 using ARDL technique on weekly basis. As statistical data of 
cryptocurrency are newly established, we build the "Crypto 50" index with its total 
trading volume and volatility to be used in our analysis.  This index is comprised of 
top 50 cryptocurrencies according to their market capitalisation rank. We sample 
most common five digital currencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Dash, 
and Monero, and we scrutinize how these currencies interaction with stock 
market (SP500 index), gold prices, and with macroeconomic indicators (Interest 
rate) both in short- and long-run. 
2. Characteristics of Cryptocurrency 
A cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that uses cryptography for 
security. A cryptocurrency is difficult to counterfeit because of this security 
feature. A defining feature of a cryptocurrency, and arguably its most endearing 
allure, is its organic nature; it is not issued by any central authority, rendering it 
theoretically immune to government interference or manipulation. It is designed 
from the ground up to take advantage of the internet and how it works. Instead of 
relying on traditional financial institutions that verify and guarantee your 
transactions, cryptocurrency transactions are verified by the user's computers 
logged into the currency's network. Since the currency is protected and 
encrypted, it becomes impossible to increase the money supply over a predefined 
algorithmic rate.  
One cryptocurrency, in particular, has entered the public lexicon as the go-to 
digital asset: Bitcoin, often is regarded as father of cryptocurrencies and all other 
cryptocurrencies are referred as altcoins. Since 2009, the finance world has been 
watching the crackerjack rise of Bitcoin with a combination of fascination and, in 
many cases, severe skepticism. Characteristics of Bitcoin make it fundamentally 
different from a fiat currency, which is backed by the full faith and credit of its 
government. Fiat currency issuance is a highly centralized activity supervised by a 
nation’s central bank. On the other hand, the value of a Bitcoin is wholly 
dependent on what investors are willing to pay for it at a point in time. It uses 
peer-to-peer blockchain network (chronologically arranged chain of blocks where 
each block has a list of transactions information) where all members are equal 
Y. Sovbetov / JEFA Vol:2 No:2 (2018) 1-27 
 
Page | 4 
 
and there is no central server that tells everyone what to do (Nakamoto, 2008). 
This decentalisation is maintained on Satoshi Nakamoto’s (2008) idea of 
combining "proof of work" (PoW) with other cryptographic techniques. The PoW, 
mathematically, is a hash function with a large number of answer variances, the 
so-called "beautiful" hash is considered to be the one that is characterized by 
starting with 15 zeros. The hash of each block is algorithmically directly linked to 
the previous block. That is, if we hypothetically represent the hash function in the 
form, 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 = 𝑜𝑜(𝜃𝜃,𝜙𝜙,𝑍𝑍) 
where θ is the hash of the previous block; ϕ is current difficulty level; and Z is a 
random key uniquely specific to the current block. This indicates that each 
subsequent block is inextricably linked to the previous one due to θ, and if any 
dishonest miner at some point decides to generate an invalid block, the other 
network members will not confirm it, because the hash of the previous block will 
not be used in it. And if spammer decides to change the hash of the previous 
block, then he will have to do this for the previous one as well, and so on until the 
genesis block (the very first block created by Satoshi Nakamoto himself). It would 
be incredibly time consuming to comb through the entire ledger to make sure 
that the person mining the most recent batch of transactions hasn't tried anything 
funny. This will require huge amount of work, which at the moment is almost 
beyond the power of one person or even a large organization. Therefore, PoW 
also maintains defense mechanisms for cryptcurrencies against hacking.  
However, PoW miners invest into advanced computer machines that 24/7 
works (consuming energy) with the goal of validating transactions (solving hashes) 
and creating new blocks. Once it finds "beautiful" it declares that the block is 
resolved and every miner gets reward (bitcoins) proportional to their work spent 
on solving the hash. Therefore, cryptocurrency mining under PoW protocol is 
painstaking, expensive, and only sporadically rewarding. Alternatively, many 
altcoins started to use “proof-of-stake” (PoS) protocol which is more cost effective 
(cheaper) and eco-friendly (greener) comparing to PoW that requires a lots of 
computer energy consumption to solve mathematical algorithmic hashes. In case 
of PoS, miners do not need expensive computer machines, the creator of a new 
block is chosen in a deterministic way, depending on its wealth, also defined as 
stake. 
Majority of cryptocurrencies has roof limit of production. It means that 
supply of cryptcurrencies would decrease over time and under ceteris paribus 
condition should lead to higher price (inflation). However, unlike centralized fiat 
currencies, the cryptocurrencies are unique since their block reward schedule is 
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public. It means that public already knows the approximate date of each decrease 
(or reward halving). Thus all expectation should have been purchased by the 
market, and therefore shrunk in supply should not affect cryptocurrencies trading 
price. For instance, Bitcoin’s first block halving happened on 28th November 2012. 
The block reward dropped from 50 BTC per block to 25 BTC per block. The price 
later climbed to $260 BTC in April 2013, followed by $1,163 BTC in November 
2013. It is unclear, however, whether these price rises were directly related to the 
block reward halving. In this research, we investigate factors that influence 
cryptocurrency prices both in short- and long-run.  
3. Literature Review 
The cryptocurrency market has seen an unprecedented level of interest from 
investors in 2016. Bitcoin, the world's largest digital currency, has risen more than 
1,500 percent since the start of 2017. However, the market is significantly more 
complex than the public lexicon might suggest. And while there have been plenty 
of studies examining the future of Bitcoin and its volatility (Polasik et al. 2015; 
Letra, 2016; Bouoiyour and Selmi, 2016; Katsiampa, 2017; Chiu and Koeppl, 2017; 
Chu et al. 2017), there have been few that explore the broader cryptocurrency 
market and how it is evolving. Bitcoin is currently trading at around $16,000; at 
the beginning of the year, Bitcoin price was at $1,000, raising warnings from some 
analysts and prominent financial figures that it’s a bubble. The currency is 
extraordinarily volatile despite its recent ever-peaking performance, rising by 
thousands of dollars in value on one day only to fall by even more the next. 
Katsiampa (2017) estimates the volatility of Bitcoin through a comparison of 
GARCH models and finds that the AR-CGARCH model gives the most optimal fit. 
He underlines that the market is high speculative. Bouoiyour and Selmi (2016) 
study daily Bitcoin prices using an optimal-GARCH model and show that the 
volatility has decreasing trend comparing pre- and post-2015 data. Even tough, 
they still observe significant asymmetries in the Bitcoin market where the prices 
are driven more by negative than positive shocks. Likewise, Dyhrberg (2016) 
investigates the asymmetric GARCH methodology to explore the hedging 
capabilities of Bitcoin and he finds that it can be used as a hedging tool against 
stocks in the Financial Times Stock Exchange Index and against the American 
dollar in the short term.  
On the other hand, El Bahrawy and Alessandretti (2017) examine behaviour 
of entire market (1469 cryptocurrencies) between April 2013 and May 2017. They 
find that cryptocurrencies appear and disappear continuously and their market 
capitalization is increasing (super-)exponentially, several statistical properties of 
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the market have been stable for years. Particularly, market share distribution and 
the turnover of crytocurrencies remain quite stable. 
There is a wide agreement on that the cryptocurrencies will not only affect 
the trading practices of different countries and business organizations, but they 
will also affect the dynamics of international relations. There are still a lot of 
people who are never accommodating the idea that cryptocurrencies will 
revolutionize how we do businesses. They can't figure out how the whole 
blockchain technology and other annexes work. Plus, advancements in technology 
are introducing digital tools that companies can use to better interact with their 
customers. A rising shift from traditional platforms to digital platforms has also 
brought about an abundant supply in data from sources like social media, mobile 
devices, online retail platforms, etc. Due to technology advancements in the areas 
of gathering, storing, and sharing data, large sets of data are easily shared among 
companies in every sector and country for little to no costs. The widespread 
accessibility of data has also brought about concerns over data privacy of 
individuals and their online transactions. Because every transaction or activity 
carried out online leaves a digital trail, individuals are opting for more anonymous 
ways to use the internet and conduct online transactions. The Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency was introduced to address the issue of privacy concern.  
Although cryptocurrencies’ decentralization, anonymity of transaction, and 
irreversibility of payments offer plenty advantages, Brill and Keene (2014) opine 
that these features also attract illegal activities (cybercriminals) such as money 
laundering, drug peddling, smuggling and weapons procurement. This issue has 
attracted the attention of powerful regulatory and other government agencies 
such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the SEC, and even 
the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In March 2013, FinCEN 
issued rules that defined virtual currency exchanges and administrators as money 
service businesses, bringing them within the ambit of government regulation. In 
May that year, the DHS froze an account of Mt. Gox – the largest Bitcoin exchange 
– that was held at Wells Fargo, alleging that it broke anti-money laundering laws. 
And in August, New York’s Department of Financial Services issued subpoenas to 
22 emerging payment companies, many of which handled Bitcoin, asking about 
their measures to prevent money laundering and ensure consumer protection.  
Plus, economist Kenneth Rogoff writes that Bitcoin will never supplant 
government-issued money because that “would make it extremely difficult to 
collect taxes or counter criminal activity.” (see Bitcoin legality in Appendix table 
1A). 
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To summarize, Poyser (2017) points three types of crypto price drivers 
organized into internal and external factors.  Supply and demand of cryptcurrency 
is main internal factors that have direct impact on its market price. On the other 
hand, attractiveness (popularity), legalization (adoption), and few macro-finance 
factors (interest rate, stock markets, gold prices) can be regarded as external 
drivers (see figure 1). 
Internal Factors  External Factors 
 
Supply & Demand 
 Transaction Cost 
(PoW / PoS) 
 Reward System 
 Mining Difficulty 
(Hash Rate) 
 Coins Circulation 
 Forks (Rule 
Changes) 
 
 
Cryptomarket 
 Attractiveness 
(Popularity) 
 Market Trend 
 Speculations 
 
 
Macro-financial 
 Stock Markets 
 Exchange Rate 
 Gold Price 
 Interest Rate 
 Others 
 
Political 
 Legalization 
(Adaptation) 
 Restrictions (Ban) 
 Others 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Factors that Influence Cryptocurrency Prices 
In this respect, we examine short- and long-run factors that influence prices 
of cryptocurrencies over 2010-2018 using ARDL technique on weekly data basis. 
First, we build Crypto 50 index by sampling top 50 cryptocoins that have 
proportional contribution to market capitalization weights. Thus, we derive few 
cryptomarket factors such as total market capitalization, trading volume, and 
volatility. We use these factors as explanatory variables for cryptocoin price 
movements alongside with attractiveness and control variables such as stock 
market movements, gold prices, and interest rates. In this study, we provide 
evidence for significant long-run role of attractiveness of cryptocurrencies in 
determination of their prices. We also observe a weak form of negative impact 
running from stock markets (SP 500 index) to cryptocurrency market, in particular 
Bitcoin. 
Cryptocoin 
Price 
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The contents of the paper are organized as follows. Next section describes 
the data with descriptive analysis and explains methodological set up of 
examination. Then, we present our key findings including our comments and 
suggestions. The final section gives concluding remarks of the study. 
4. Data and Methodology 
The literature about economics of cryptocurrency is scant as the topic just 
recently gained focus on research fields. We contribute to this context by 
examining factors that influence prices of most common five cryptocurrencies 
over 2010-2018 with weekly data. For this examination, we define our 
econometric set up as following. 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖Ω𝑐𝑐3𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 ,𝑐𝑐 + �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐            (1) 
where m is optimal lag length which is determined by information criteria; Pc,t is 
endogenous variable in the system and it denotes price of cryptocurrency "c" in 
natural logarithmic form at month t. We treat all other variables in the system as 
exogenous variables. The Ω represents three cryptomarket variables of MARPt, 
MARVt, and MARSt that are Crypto 50 index price (see section 4.1), its trading 
volume, and its volatility at week t; and ATRc,t is attractiveness of currency "c". 
Plus, we also account k set of control variables of Zi such as stock market (proxied 
by SP500 index), exchange rates (EURO/USD), the U.S. interest rates, and world 
gold price.  
Data for cryptocurrencies are gathered from BitInfoCharts1 website; price of 
SP500 index is retrieved from Yahoo Finance2, and macroeconomic data are 
obtained from World Bank3. The attractiveness of cryptocurrency is proxied by its 
Google search frequency; we derive related data from Google search trends4.  
4.1. Building Crypto 50 index 
First of all, we sample big 50 market capped cryptocurrencies (these 50 
cryptocoins forms about 92% of entire cryptomarket). We derive data for market 
capitalization, trading volume, opening-closing prices, and high-low prices from 
                                                          
1 BitInfoCharts - https://bitinfocharts.com/ 
2 Historical Prices - https://finance.yahoo.com/world-indices 
3 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
4 https://trends.google.com/trends 
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Coinsmarketcap5. Then, we calculate weight of each cryptocoins in the index on 
the basis of their market capitalization. We establish Crypto 50 index (CRX50) 
price by summing all fifty weighted-prices as following methodology. 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶50 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 = � 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶50,𝑐𝑐 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐50𝑖𝑖=1                               (2) 
where MCi,t and Pi,t  are market capitalization and price of cryptocoin i at time t 
respectively; and MCCRX50,t is total market capitalization of cryptocoins, that forms 
CRX50, at time t. We also derive daily trading volume of CRX50 index by simply 
summing up trading volumes of all its constituents.  
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶50 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 = �𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐50
𝑖𝑖=1                                         (3) 
where VOLi,t  is total trading volume of cryptocoin i at time t. Then, we derive daily 
volatility of our CRX50 index using formula below. 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶50 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐 = 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 = 𝑏𝑏 𝑐𝑐 �𝑃𝑃ℎ ,𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑐𝑐 �                                   (4) 
where Ph,t is the highest price of CRX50 index recorder at day t, while Pl,t is the 
lowest price of CRX50 index recorded at day t. The high-low price of CRX50 index 
is derived by methodology explained in equation 2. 
4.2. Brief Overview of Cryptocurrency Market 
We briefly summarize economics of cryptocurrency market by outlining key 
statistics. Coin Dance 6  regularly announces up-to-date and historical report 
statistics of cryptocurrency markets. According their most recent report, 34.4% of 
total market share belongs to Bitcoin, while 19.23%, 10.74%, and 1.97% shares 
are attributable to Ethereum, Ripple, and Litcoin respectively. Moreover, their 
report shows that 96.57% of cryptocurrency market involvers are males, while 
only 3.43% are females. The age distribution refers to ability of the cryptocurrency 
market to attract wide range of people from very young to very old. The report 
gives statistics for only 18+ ages where 8.36% of the market involvers are aged 18-
24, while 45.71% and 30.62% are attributable to people aged 25-34 and 35-44 
respectively. Interestingly, the share of elderly people (45+) is about 16% which 
provides evidence for that cryptocurrency market attracts from youngest to 
                                                          
5 https://coinmarketcap.com/ 
6 https://coin.dance 
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elderly people into financial activities. The cryptocurrency interest and affinity 
statistics also show that people of cryptocurrency community are mainly engaged 
with financial activities, pursing investment opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cryptocurrency Market Share and Engagement Demographics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. Bitcoin Community Interest and Affinity 
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On the other hand, Google search frequency for "Bitcoin" (or "BTC") and 
"Blockchain" terms also shows fairly significant correlation with Bitcoin and 
Altcoins prices respectively (see figure 4). This seems to be a significant 
explanatory factor of cryptocurrency prices; therefore, we use this indicator to 
proxy attractiveness of cryptocurrency in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Bitcoin-Altcoin Market Cap vs Bitcoin-Blockchain Google Search Trends 
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To summarize, we briefly outline some cryptocurrency-specific figures in 
table 1, plus, we describe our data with brief abbreviations and statistics in table 
2. 
Table 1. Overview of Cryptocurrency Market 
 
Bitcoin Ethereum Dash Litecoin Monero 
Total 16.7 million BTC 96.8 million ETH 7.8 million DASH 54.7 million LTC 15.6 million XMR 
Price (USD) $ 14,729.86 $ 1,082.47  $ 1,067.01 $ 248.93 $ 389.18  
Market Cap. (USD) $248 billion $106 billion $8 billion $13 billion $6 billion 
Transactions / hour 13,609 49,900 614 6,036 220 
Sent / hour 121,019 BTC  ($1.8 billion USD) 
558,178 ETH  
($612 million 
USD) 
9,276 DASH  
($10 million USD) 
559,875 LTC  
($140 million 
USD) 
683,751 XRP 
($1.63 million 
USD) 
Avg. Transaction Value 8.89 BTC  ($131,519 USD) 
11.19 ETH 
($12,273 USD) 
15.10 DASH 
($16,146 USD) 
92.76 LTC 
($23,174 USD) 
75.28 XMR 
($29,297 USD) 
Median Transaction 
Value 
0.366 BTC 
($5,416.88 USD)  
0.197 ETH 
($216.3 USD) 
0.605 DASH 
($647.12 USD) 
10.83 LTC 
($2,706.15 USD) 
9.35 XMR 
($3638.33 USD) 
Block Time 9m 17s 15.8s 2m 37s 2m 33s 2m 0s 
Blocks Count 503,189 4,875,208 800,814 1,346,832 1,487116 
Blocks last 24h 154 5460 548 562 713 
Blocks / hour 6 228 23 23 30 
Reward Per Block 12.50  BTC  ($246,517 USD) 
3 ETH  
($4,744 USD) 
3.60  DASH  
($3,867USD) 
25 LTC  
($6,321 USD) 
5.43 XMR 
($2,186 USD) 
Difficulty  1.93114*1012 2.003*1015 70.58*106 3.7*106 75.8 * 109 
Hashrate (Hash/second) 15.58 * 1018 169.10 *1012  1.93 *1015  99.98 *1012  6.26 * 108 
Mining Profitability/Day  2.4364 USD 0.1531 USD 0.5493 USD 0.0355 USD 2.4905 USD 
Wealth Distribution 
Top 10 addesses 
Top 100 addesses 
Top 1,000 addesses 
Top 10,000 addesses 
10 - 5.25%  
100 - 17.89% 
1000 - 34.25%  
10000 - 55.66% 
10 - 10.82% 
100 - 33.90% 
1000 - 53.75% 
10000 - 69.61% 
10 - 6.32% 
100 - 15.64% 
1000 - 28.53% 
10000 - 92.37% 
10 - 14.44% 
100 - 48.61% 
1000 - 65.91%  
10000 - 79.96% 
10 - 18.03% 
100 - 51.17% 
1000 - 71.85%  
10000 - 84.29% 
100 Largest  
Transactions in  
Last 24h 
713,840 BTC  
($10.56 billion)  
24.58% Total 
1,055,897 ETH  
($1.1 billion)  
7.88% Total 
128,562 DASH 
($137 million)  
57.75% Total  
2,806,164 LTC  
($701 million)  
20.88% Total 
2,042,328 XMR 
($794 million) 
13.25% Total 
First Block (Genesis) 2009-01-09 2015-07-30 2014-01-19 2011-10-08 2014-04-18 
Blockchain Size 178.49 GB 293.11 GB 5.04 GB 12.69 GB 39.22 GB 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Series Abbr Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis N 
PR
IC
E 
Bitcoin price BITPP 4.43 5.48 9.72 -2.81 2.86 -0.76 2.86 390 
Ethereum price ETHP 2.91 2.48 6.87 -0.80 2.08 0.15 2.03 126 
Dash price DASP 2.28 1.85 
 
7.35 -0.53 1.84 1.01 3.01 203 
Litcoin price LITP 1.83 1.36 
 
5.75 0.15 1.16 1.24 3.85 245 
Monero price MONP 0.63 -0.15 6.15 -3.99 2.41 0.43 2.15 193 
EURO/USD price EURP 1.25 1.28 1.48 1.04 0.12 -0.13 1.65 390 
Gold price GOLP 7.21 7.17 7.51 6.96 0.14 0.57 2.27 390 
SP500 price SPP 7.46 7.53 7.91 6.96 0.24 -0.23 1.81 390 
M
AR
KE
T 
CA
P 
Bitcoin mar.cap BITM 12.34 3.47 297.53 0.00 34.99 5.67 39.72 390 
Ethereum mar.cap ETHM 9.80 0.99 85.70 0.03 17.02 2.28 8.65 126 
Dash mar.cap DASM 0.54 0.03 9.55 0.00 1.46 4.31 23.70 203 
Litcoin mar.cap LITM 0.78 0.18 19.01 0.04 2.23 6.03 43.28 245 
Monero mar.cap MONM 2.19 0.24 95.46 0.03 7.74 8.74 97.55 193 
TR
AD
IN
G 
VO
LU
M
E 
Bitcoin volume BITV 4.50 4.04 10.01 2.25 1.75 1.15 3.60 210 
Ethereum volume ETHV 3.45 3.03 8.54 -1.61 2.60 0.07 2.18 126 
Dash volume DASV -0.42 -1.25 6.71 -4.65 2.62 0.85 2.59 203 
Litcoin volume LITV 2.00 1.26 8.13 -0.37 1.96 1.31 3.63 210 
Monero volume MONV 0.63 -0.15 6.15 -4.00 2.41 0.43 2.15 193 
M
AR
KE
T CRX50 price MARP 4.31 5.37 9.23 -2.81 2.75 -0.86 2.96 390 
CRX50 mar.cap MARM -0.39 1.37 6.45 -11.33 4.10 -1.01 3.34 390 
CRX50 volume MARV -2.04 -2.54 3.99 -4.32 1.97 1.20 3.51 210 
CRX50 volatility MARS -3.11 -3.21 0.04 -9.87 1.07 -0.27 6.74 390 
AT
TR
AC
TI
VE
NE
SS
 Bitcoin trend BITA 0.78 0.78 2.00 0.30 0.34 1.32 4.92 390 
Ethereum trend ETHA 0.14 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.40 3.23 9.85 126 
Dash trend DASA 0.15 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.30 3.42 10.87 203 
Litcoin trend LITA 0.10 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.32 3.49 12.87 245 
Monero trend MONA 0.31 0.30 2.00 0.00 0.21 4.75 33.38 193 
 
4.3. Model Specification 
Prior to cointegration analysis, we should make sure that variables are 
integrated at same degree. We examine characteristics of all series by employing 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test as following. 
𝛥𝛥𝛺𝛺𝑐𝑐 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝛵𝛵 + 𝜌𝜌𝛺𝛺𝑐𝑐−1 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖+1𝛥𝛥𝛺𝛺𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐                                   (2)  
where ΔΩt is the first difference of a variable Ω; Τ is a trend, and θ1 is its multiplier; 
k is an optimal lag length; and εt is a White Noise residual term. Here, ADF 
Y. Sovbetov / JEFA Vol:2 No:2 (2018) 1-27 
 
Page | 14 
 
hypothesizes H0 (ρ=0) against alternative (ρ<0), and rejection of the null confirms 
stationarity of Ω. 
We display results of ADF test in table 3 where we find majority of series are 
non-stationary at level. But they can be converted to a stationary through first 
differencing methodology. Thus, we conclude that all series are I(1) variables, 
except volatility (sigma) and few attractiveness series that are seem to be I(0). 
Finding series are not integrated in same degree, we decide to use Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration framework which is also known as Bound 
testing approach. This technique is applicable for series with mixture of I(0) and 
I(1) variables, but none of them should be I(2).  
Table 3. Output of ADF Analysis 
  Level First Difference 
 Series Prob. Lag   Max Lag N Prob. Lag   Max Lag N 
PR
IC
E 
BITPP 0.3360 1 16 388 0.0000 0 16 388 
ETHP 0.5106 2 12 123 0.0000 1 12 123 
DASP 0.9654 0 14 202 0.0000 0 14 201 
LITP 0.9873 0 15 244 0.0000 0 15 243 
MONP 0.2991 2 14 190 0.0000 1 14 190 
EURP 0.4698 0 16 389 0.0000 0 16 388 
GOLP 0.2050 0 16 389 0.0000 0 16 388 
SPP 0.2148 1 16 388 0.0000 0 16 388 
M
AR
KE
T 
CA
P 
BITM 0.1352 3 16 386 0.0238 2 16 386 
ETHM 0.1927 3 12 122 0.0003 1 12 123 
DASM 0.9847 0 14 202 0.0375 1 14 200 
LITM 0.9272 2 15 242 0.0458 2 15 241 
MONM 0.8451 0 14 190 0.0174 0 14 189 
TR
AD
IN
G 
VO
LU
M
E 
BITV 0.1214 1 14 208 0.0000 3 14 205 
ETHV 0.0231 0 12 125 0.0000 0 12 124 
DASV 0.6298 2 14 200 0.0000 1 14 200 
LITV 0.6355 2 14 207 0.0000 1 14 207 
MONV 0.4942 0 14 190 0.0000 1 14 188 
M
AR
KE
T MARP 0.2931 1 16 388 0.0000 0 16 388 
MARM 0.1334 3 16 386 0.0000 2 16 386 
MARV 0.7168 2 14 207 0.0000 3 14 205 
MARS 0.0000 1 16 388 0.0000 5 16 383 
AT
TR
AC
TI
VE
NE
SS
 BITA 0.0732 2 16 388 0.0051 1 16 388 
ETHA 0.0978 1 12 124 0.0308 0 12 124 
DASA 0.1433 2 14 200 0.0165 0 14 201 
LITA 0.1340 2 15 242 0.0334 1 15 242 
MONA 0.1143 0 15 190 0.0291 0 15 189 
Notes:  The numbers are F-statistics derived with ADF unit root test using levels and first differences. 
The lag length criterion is set as Schwarz (1978) Information Criterion (SIC) with automatic maximum 
25 lags. The tested model includes individual effects and individual linear trends.  
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The bound testing methodology, is pioneered by Pesaran et al (2001), tests 
potential cointegration of I(0) and I(1) variables in long-run. The technique also 
provides some evidence for series short-run and error-correction dynamics. Thus, 
we recall equation 1, and adjust it in accordance to the ARDL approach following 
Pesaran et al (2001) as below. 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖∆𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 + ��𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∆𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖=14𝑖𝑖=1 + φ1𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐−1 + �φ2𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐−1 + φ3𝑖𝑖 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐−14𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐        (3) 
where X stands for four cryptocurrency-related variables of MARP, MARV, MARS, 
and ATR; and Z stands for four control variables of SPP, EURP, GOLP, and INT. The 
lag of dependent variable starts from 1 to its optimal lag length (m). However, the 
independent variables begin from lag zero and continue up to their optimal, i.e. 
n1-n8, which are determined by Schwartz (1978) Information Criterion (SIC). 
Thus, the null hypothesis of φ1= φ2j=φ3j=0 is tested with Wald analysis where 
rejection of H0, under Pesaran et al (2001) lower and upper bound critical values, 
indicates existence of long-run cointegration between series only if the residual of 
equation 1.0 model (εt) is stationary. In case of justification of these requirements 
the Restricted Error Correction Model (RECM) can be formulated as below. 
∆𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽0 + �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖∆𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 ,𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 + ��𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∆𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝑐𝑐−𝑖𝑖
𝑐𝑐
𝑖𝑖=1
4
𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐 ,𝑐𝑐−1 + 𝜔𝜔𝑐𝑐         (4) 
where ECTc is White-noise stationary residual of long-run equation 2 (εt), and λc is 
its multiplier that is expected to be statistically significant in the range of -1 and 0 
for robustness of RECM model (3). In case, λc is estimated positive, then the 
model is suffering of serially correlated residual terms (autocorrelation problem). 
And if λc is estimated negative but greater than 1 (in absolute terms), then the 
model is instable comprising of structural breaks that are needed to be controlled 
(Sovbetov and Saka, 2018). 
5. Findings 
Firstly, we ensure that residual of equation 1 model (εt) is stationary at 1% 
significance level. Next, we employ an ARDL optimal lag selection test in Eviews 
9.0 software for equation 3 model, setting maximum lag length as 4 under SIC. As 
a result, the test finds ARDL(3,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) specification as most appropriate 
for BITP model where SIC value (10.8776) is the minimum (see Figure 5, Panel A). 
In other words, the SIC suggests that our ARDL model should include only three 
lags of dependent variables (Pc), one lag of MARP and MARV. For robustness of 
this ARDL model, we examine its residual under Serial Correlation LM and 
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Heteroskedasticity test. We find that residuals do not comprise these two 
problems as probabilities of Chi-Square statistics of Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM test and Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity test are 
greater than 11% and 12% respectively. However, the percentages are quite close 
to 10% significance level, therefore, we use HAC-robust standard errors in ARDL 
model. Further, we examine the stability of the model by employing CUSUM test 
that checks changes in cumulative sum of recursive residuals over time. In panel B 
of the figure 5, we demonstrate graphical outcome of CUSUM test where clearly 
seen that CUSUM (blue) line does not exceed ±5% significance (two red) lines, 
indicating stability of our model over the analysis period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. ARDL Lag Selection for BITP model with SIC & Stability of Selected ARDL Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. ARDL Lag Selection for ETHP model with SIC & Stability of Selected ARDL Model 
 
Panel A. ARDL Lag Selection with SIC Panel B. CUSUM Test Result for ARDL Model 
Panel A. ARDL Lag Selection with SIC Panel B. CUSUM Test Result for ARDL Model 
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Figure 7. ARDL Lag Selection for DASP model with SIC & Stability of Selected ARDL Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. ARDL Lag Selection for LITP model with SIC & Stability of Selected ARDL Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. ARDL Lag Selection for MONP model with SIC & Stability of Selected ARDL Model 
Panel A. ARDL Lag Selection with SIC Panel B. CUSUM Test Result for ARDL Model 
Panel A. ARDL Lag Selection with SIC Panel B. CUSUM Test Result for ARDL Model 
Panel A. ARDL Lag Selection with SIC Panel B. CUSUM Test Result for ARDL Model 
Y. Sovbetov / JEFA Vol:2 No:2 (2018) 1-27 
 
Page | 18 
 
Similarly, on basis of minimum SIC value, we select the most appropriate 
ARDL models for ETHP (see figure 6), DASP (see figure 7), LITP (see figure 8), and 
MONP (see figure 9).  
After specifying most appropriate models for our five cryptocurrency, we run 
equation 1 for each models separately. Table 4 reports outcome of these analyses 
where we observe plausible results. These models comprise both short- and long-
run dynamics. In all cases Pt-1 derives statistically significant estimates at 1% level. 
We can derive long-run multipliers of related variables by using formula of -φi/φ1 
where i has an array of {21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 34} that corresponds to {MARP, 
MARV, MARS, ATR, EURP, GOLP, SPP, INT}. However, we first need to carry out 
Wald test hypothesizing H0: φi=0, to examine whether these series 
(cryptocurrency market variables and control variables) have statistically 
significant long-run interactions with Pt (cryptocurrency BITP, ETHP, DASP, LITP, 
and MONP). We report results of Walt test in table 5 for each cryptocurrency 
where critical values for lower (I(0)) and upper (I(1)) bounds of each case also are 
given. Case I should be used for models that include neither intercept nor trends 
of any kind. Case II should be used for models that comprise only restricted 
intercept without any trends. In other words, the intercept is allowed only in long-
run (Unrestricted ECM) model, but not short-run (Restricted ECM) model. On the 
other hand, case III allows unrestricted intercept, but no any trends. In this case, 
short-run model has an intercept and no trends. Case IV should be used for 
models that comprise both unrestricted intercept and restricted trend. So that 
short-run specification of these models includes intercept, while long-run 
specification comprises trend factor. 
Therefore, specifying short- and long-run ARDL models is important. In this 
respect, we follow simple logic, we look if inclusion of intercept and trend add 
statistically significance into models or not. Once, we find they are statistically 
significant; we left them in the model. Following this methodology, we observe 
that trend factor appears insignificant in all cases (BITP, ETHP, DASP, LITP, and 
MONP). Thus, we disregard it in all cases. On the other hand, intercepts in BITP, 
LITP, and MONP models appear significant only in long-run, but not in short-run. 
Therefore, we choose case II specification for these three models. Intercept 
appears statistically insignificant only in DASP model, consequently removing it 
from the model we end up with case I specification.  Lastly, we observe that 
intercept in unrestricted in short-run model of ETHP as it derived statistically 
significance at 1% level. Thus, we choose case III specification for ETHP model. 
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Table 4. Results of ARDL Models 
Variable ΔBITP ΔETHP ΔDASP ΔLITP ΔMONP 
ΔPt-1 
0.4208*** 
(0.0851) - 
0.2362** 
(0.1165) 
0.2188*** 
(0.0799) 
0.9310*** 
(0.1865) 
ΔPt-2 
0.0260** 
(0.0131) - 
0.3307** 
(0.1422) 
0.2297** 
(0.1187) - 
ΔMARPt 
0.6966*** 
(0.0715) 
0.2111*** 
(0.0313) 
0.7837*** 
(0.0117) 
0.7573*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0484*** 
(0.0071) 
ΔMARVt 
0.1312*** 
(0.0328) - - - 
0.0061*** 
(0.0015) 
MARPt-1 (φ21) 
0.0676*** 
(0.0209) 
0.0839*** 
(0.0320) 
0.0944** 
(0.0375) 
0.1419** 
(0.0618) 
0.1101** 
(0.0562) 
MARVt-1 (φ22) 
0.0121** 
(0.0055) 
0.0287** 
(0.0124) 
0.0107*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0265* 
(0.0154) 
0.0143 
(0.0187) 
MARSt-1  (φ23) 
-0.0128 
(0.0139) 
-0.0328 
(0.0364) 
-0.0205 
(0.0214) 
-0.0090 
(0.0162) 
-0.0028 
(0.0032) 
ATRt-1      (φ24)   
0.1085*** 
(0.0311) 
0.0521*** 
(0.0162) 
0.0328 
(0.0493) 
0.0288*** 
(0.0101) 
0.0205 
(0.0171) 
EURPt-1 (φ31) 
0.0628 
(0.0428) 
0.0376 
(0.0909) 
0.0126 
(0.0344) 
0.0164 
(0.0380) 
0.0133 
(0.0349) 
GOLPt-1 (φ32) 
-0.0333 
(0.0439) 
0.0131 
(0.0374) 
-0.0023 
(0.0682) 
0.0109 
(0.0597) 
0.0092 
(0.0401) 
SPPt-1   (φ33) 
0.0696* 
(0.0368) 
0.0467* 
(0.0251) 
0.0349 
(0.0316) 
0.0165* 
(0.0103) 
0.0122 
(0.0169) 
INTt-1   (φ34) 
-0.0317 
(0.0535) 
-0.0128 
(0.0702) 
-0.0049 
(0.0172) 
-0.0189 
(0.0328) 
-0.0001 
(0.0007) 
Pt-1       (φ1) 
-0.0851*** 
(0.0299) 
-0.2181*** 
(0.0529) 
-0.8801*** 
(0.1179) 
-0.4127*** 
(0.0780) 
-0.4331*** 
(0.1091) 
intercept -0.0391*** (0.0118) 
-0.0597*** 
(0.0276) - 
0.0325*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0404*** 
(0.0060) 
R-squared 0.7122 0.5929 0.4703 0.5791 0.5454 
DurbinWatson 2.0109 1.9282 2.0629 1.9929 1.9489 
BG LM Test 0.1095 0.1413 0.0782 0.1276 0.0391 
BPG Test 0.1216 0.0738 0.0655 0.0588 0.1302 
Notes: Numbers in the table are estimations derived by ARDL technique with maximum 4 lags 
allowance. We use SIC in lag length selection. The standard errors are in HAC-robust characteristics 
with Bartlett kernel and Newey-West (1987) fixed bandwidth 5. 
 Table 5 presents Wald test of our five models comparatively with Pesaran et 
al (2001) critical values of lower and upper bounds for k=8. This k indicates 
number of original regressors in the model, except the dependent variable. The 
table shows that computed F-statistics exceeds critical bound values even at 1% 
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significance level in all cases, signifying strong long-run cointegrations among 
mentioned series.  
Table 5. F-test with Bound Critical Values  
 10% level 5% level 1% level 
Wald Test 
Bounds 
Lower 
Bound 
[I(0)] 
Upper 
Bound 
[I(1)] 
Lower 
Bound 
[I(0)] 
Upper 
Bound 
[I(1)] 
Lower 
Bound 
[I(0)] 
Upper 
Bound 
[I(1)] 
Case I 1.66 2.79 1.91 3.11 2.45 3.79 DASP    (5.04***) 
Case II 1.85 2.85 2.11 3.15 2.62 3.77 
BITP     (8.96***)  
LITP      (6.40***) 
MONP (5.28***) 
Case III 1.95 3.06 2.22 3.39 2.79 4.1 ETHP    (7.53***) 
Case IV 2.13 3.09 2.38 3.41 2.93 4.06   
Notes: The critical values for each case are retrieved from Pesaran et al (2001) Table CI. The k 
indicates the number original regressors in the model. Therefore, it is 8 for in equation 1 model 
(disregarding dependent variable Pt-1). Wald test hypothesizes null H0: φi=0. The significance levels 
respectively as *:10%, **:5%, and ***:1%. 
Now, we can estimate approximate magnitude of cointegrations (long-run 
relationships) by calculating negative ratio of coefficients of independent variables 
to dependent one (-φi/φ1). Table 6 shows these long-run multipliers automatically 
derived by Eviews software with their HAC-robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
According to results, we document that long-run market beta (coefficient of 
MARP) is statistically significant at 1% level in Bitcoin and Ethereum models where 
its multiplier is 0.79 and 0.38 respectively. Whereas, Dash, Litcoin, and Monero 
models predict it as 0.11, 0.34, and 0.25 respectively at 5% significance level. We 
believe that these results emerge as Bitcoin and Ethereum comprise the largest 
market share of entire cryptocurrency market, and their beta coefficient shows 
higher responsiveness to the market in long-run. In other words, 1 unit increase in 
MARP leads Bitcoin and Ethereum to increase by 0.79 and 0.38 units respectively. 
On the other hand, trading volume appears to have significant long-run 
impact on Bitcoin at 1% significance level and on Ethereum, Litcoin, and Monero 
at 10% significance level. In case of Dash model, it appears statistically 
insignificant. The result indicates that a unit increase in weekly trading volume 
causes 0.14, 0.13, 0.06, and 0.03 increases in Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litcoin, and 
Monero cryptocurrencies in long-run. Sigma, proxied by volatility of the 
cryptocurrency market, emerges statistically significant long-run impact on all 
cryptocurrencies. The sign of impact is negative, which indicates a unit increase in 
volatility of the market causes Bitcoin to drop by 0.15 units, Ethereum by 0.15 
units, Dash by 0.02, Litcoin by 0.02 units, and Monero by 0.01 units in long-run. In 
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addition, we observe that attractiveness (proxied by Google search term 
frequency) also derives significant coefficients for Bitcoin and Ethereum at 1% 
significance level and for Litcoin and Monero at 10% significance level. It indicates 
that 1 unit increase in Google trend popularity of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litcoin, and 
Monero leads 1.27, 0.24, 0.07, and 0.05 units increases in their prices in long-run 
respectively. Google search frequency appears to be insignificant factor for Dash.  
Coming to macroeconomic control variables, we observe that majority of 
them seem to be statistically insignificant factor in explaining price movements in 
cryptocurrencies. Only, SP500 index derives weak form of significant coefficient 
(10% level) in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litcoin models. The positive sign of SPP 
indicates that a unit increase leads 0.81, 0.21, 0.04 raise in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and 
Litcoin prices respectively in long-run. The logic behind this relationship appears 
ambiguous. Normally, one could expect a stronger USD against other fiat 
currencies (including cryptocurrencies) when SPP increases. 
Table 6. Long-run estimates of Cryptocurrency ARDL models 
  BITP ETHP DASP LITP MONP 
MARP 0.7944*** 
(0.0599) 
0.3847*** 
(0.0654) 
0.1073** 
(0.0519) 
0.3438** 
(0.1649) 
0.2542** 
(0.1202) 
MARV 0.1425*** 
(0.0349) 
0.1316* 
(0.0713) 
0.0122 
(0.0177) 
0.0642* 
(0.0362) 
0.0330* 
(0.0187) 
MARS -0.1511*** 
(0.0526) 
-0.1504*** 
(0.0564) 
-0.0233* 
(0.0125) 
-0.0218** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0032) 
ATR 1.2750*** 
(0.1511) 
0.2389*** 
(0.0721) 
0.0373 
(0.0328) 
0.0698** 
(0.0334) 
0.0473** 
(0.0197) 
EURP 0.7381*** 
(0.2446) 
0.1724 
(0.1149) 
0.0143 
(0.0385) 
0.0397 
0.0502) 
0.0307 
(0.0349) 
GOLP -0.3913 
(0.2788) 
0.0601 
(0.0795) 
-0.0026 
(0.0681) 
-0.0264 
(0.0681) 
-0.0212 
(0.0401) 
SPP 0.8179* 
(0.4250) 
0.2141* 
(0.1133) 
0.0397 
(0.0324) 
0.0400* 
(0.0213) 
0.0282 
(0.0184) 
INT -0.3725 
(0.2357) 
-0.0587 
(0.0683) 
-0.0056 
(0.0243) 
-0.0458 
(0.0464) 
-0.0002 
(0.0171) 
C 0.4596*** (0.0827)  -  - 
0.3668*** 
(0.0739) 
0.4284*** 
(0.0817) 
Notes: Estimates are derived by long-run unrestricted ARDL technique with HAC-robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. The significance levels are: 10% (*), 5% (**), and1% (***). 
Further, we estimate short-run error-correction equation (4) and we report 
outcome of this analysis in table 7. Apparently, all ECM models generate 
consistent coefficients. The coefficient of MKT implies that a unit increase in 
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cryptocurrency market return causes Bitcoin, Ethereum, Dash, Litcoin, and 
Monero to increase by 0.85, 0.39, 0.04, 0.12, and 0.09 units respectively in short-
run. Notice that short-run coefficients of Bitcoin and Ethereum are higher 
comparing to their long-run coefficients, indicating that their responses are more 
sensitive in the short-run. Likewise, a unit increase in cryptcurrency market 
trading volume leads mentioned cryptocurrencies to increase by 0.03, 0.01, 0.007, 
0.005, and 0.004 units respectively at 1%-5% significance level. These short-run 
coefficients seem to be lesser than their long-run magnitudes at table 6, indicating 
that responses of the cryptocurrencies to the fluctuations in market trading 
volume are higher in long-run. 
Table 7. Short-run estimates of ARDL Error-Correction Cryptocurrency models 
  BITP ETHP DASP LITP MONP 
ΔPt-1 
0.2087*** 
(0.0429)  - 
0.1585*** 
(0.0545) 
0.3973*** 
(0.0651) 
0.5271*** 
(0.1163) 
ΔPt-2 
0.1251*** 
(0.0115)  - 
0.1162*** 
(0.0322) 
0.1862*** 
(0.0642)  - 
ΔMARP 0.8485*** (0.0983) 
0.3914*** 
(0.0457) 
0.0414** 
(0.0187) 
0.1195** 
(0.0531) 
0.0874** 
(0.0428) 
ΔMARV 0.0315*** (0.0022) 
0.0113*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0075** 
(0.0034) 
0.0053** 
(0.0027) 
0.0041** 
(0.0020) 
ΔMARS -0.3896** (0.1902) 
-0.2409* 
(0.1453) 
-0.1695* 
(0.0913) 
-0.1991** 
(0.0977) 
-0.1347* 
(0.0735) 
ΔATR 0.1372* (0.0817) 
0.0538 
(0.0644) 
0.0270 
(0.0451) 
0.0257 
(0.0211) 
0.0288 
(0.0436) 
ΔEURP 0.0723 (0.1131) 
0.0473 
(0.0899) 
0.0148 
(0.0595) 
0.0245 
(0.0395) 
0.0280 
(0.0409) 
ΔGOLP 0.1399 (0.1664) 
-0.0023 
(0.0962) 
0.0768 
(0.1452) 
0.0462 
(0.0565) 
0.0301 
(0.0403) 
ΔSPP -0.2020* (0.1328) 
-0.0683 
(0.0676) 
0.0410 
(0.0718) 
-0.0360 
(0.0328) 
-0.0203 
(0.0302) 
ΔINT -0.0597 (0.1106) 
-0.0234 
(0.0844) 
-0.0022 
(0.0087) 
-0.0175 
(0.0314) 
-0.0019 
(0.0058) 
C  - 1.1541*** (0.2118)  -  -  - 
ECTt-1 
-0.2368*** 
(0.0361) 
-0.1276*** 
(0.0303) 
-0.1020*** 
(0.0212) 
-0.2291*** 
(0.0472) 
-0.1427*** 
(0.0335) 
Notes: The estimates are derived by short-run RECM ARDL model with HAC-robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. ECTt-1 shows speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. The 
significance levels are: 10% (*), 5% (**), and1% (***). For data description and abbreviations see 
table 2. 
Market volatility also appears statistically significant and negatively signed as 
it was in long-run. Moreover, short-run magnitudes of all cryptocurrencies are 
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several-fold comparing to their long-run magnitudes, signalizing that the 
cryptocurrencies show more severe reaction to the market's volatility in short-
run. 
Interestingly, attractiveness factor derives insignificant estimates for almost 
all models, except Bitcoin that predicts 0.14 coefficient at 10% significance level. 
This indicates that impact of attractiveness on cryptocurrency is subjected to time 
factor, indicating that it has latent characteristics and its formation (may be also 
recognition by the market) requires a time. 
On the other hand, macroeconomic control variables appear insignificant in 
all short-run models, except Bitcoin model that predicts estimate of SPP factor as -
0.2020 at 10% significance level. This indicates that a unit increase in SP500 index 
causes Bitcoin prices to decrease by 0.20 units in short-run. An inverse 
relationship is documented in long-run with absolute magnitude of several-fold. 
This, indeed, confirms negative correlation between Bitcoin prices and SP500 
index in short-run. 
Lastly, error correction terms (ECT) in all models appear statistically 
significant at 1% level with negative sign complying with the ECM theory. Bitcoin 
model seems to be correcting 23.68% of its previous period disequilibrium in the 
way converging its long-run level. This adjustment speed in Etherem, Dash, 
Litcoin, and Monero is 12.76%, 10.20%, 22.91%, and 14.27% respectively. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper examines factors that influence prices of most common five 
cryptocurrencies such Bitcoin, Ethereum, Dash, Litecoin, and Monero over 2010-
2018 using weekly data and documents several results. First, using differencing 
methodology to stationarize series wipes out potential long-run interactions 
between series; therefore, we use Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
technique in order to account both short- and long-run dynamics of 
cryptocurrency prices as our data sample is comprised of mixture of I(0) and I(1) 
variables.  Unrestricted long-run ARDL and restricted short-run error-correction 
analyses find statistically significant impact running from cryptomarket factors 
such as total market prices, trading volume, and volatility on to five 
cryptocurrencies in long- and short-run respectively.  
The cryptomarket beta derives a long-run multiplier of 0.79 on Bitcoin and 
0.38 on Ethereum at 1% significance level, while it generates 0.11, 0.34, and 0.25 
long-run impacts on Dash, Litcoin, and Monero at 5% significance level. This 
indicates that Bitcoin and Ethereum have higher responsiveness to the market in 
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long-run. In case of short-run, a unit increase in cryptocurrency market return 
causes Bitcoin, Ethereum, Dash, Litcoin, and Monero to increase by 0.85, 0.39, 
0.04, 0.12, and 0.09 units respectively in short-run. As short-run multiplier of 
Bitcoin and Ethereum are greater than their long-run coefficients, we conclude 
that these responses of these two cryptocurrencies are more sensitive in short-
run. 
Trading volume appears to have significant long-run impact on Bitcoin at 1% 
significance level and on Ethereum, Litcoin, and Monero at 10% significance level, 
indicating a unit increase in weekly trading volume causes 0.14, 0.13, 0.06, and 
0.03 raises in Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litcoin, and Monero cryptocurrencies in long-run. 
In case of short-run dynamics, all five cryptocurrencies earn statistically significant 
estimates. However, these estimates seem to be lesser than their long-run 
magnitudes, indicating that responses of the cryptocurrencies to the fluctuations 
in market trading volume are higher in long-run. 
Likewise, volatility of the cryptocurrency market appears to be statistically 
significant determinant both in long- and short-runs for all cryptocurrencies. The 
sign of impact is negative, which indicates a unit increase in volatility of the 
market causes Bitcoin to drop by 0.15 units, Ethereum by 0.15 units, Dash by 0.02, 
Litcoin by 0.02 units, and Monero by 0.01 units in long-run. In case of short-run, 
these impacts seem to be several-fold, indicating that the cryptocurrencies show 
more severe reaction to the market's volatility in short-run. 
Attractiveness of cryptocurrencies also matters for all except Dash, but only 
in long-run. It derives significant coefficients for Bitcoin and Ethereum at 1% 
significance level and for Litcoin and Monero at 10% significance level, indicating 
that 1 unit increase in attractiveness of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litcoin, and Monero 
leads 1.27, 0.24, 0.07, and 0.05 units increases in their long-run prices 
respectively. In case of short-run analysis, attractiveness factor derives 
insignificant estimates for almost all models, except Bitcoin that earns an estimate 
of 0.14 at 10% significance level. This indicates that formation and recognition of 
the attractiveness of cryptocurrencies are subjected to time factor. In other 
words, they travel slowly within the market. 
In case of control variables, SP500 index derives weak form of positive 
significant coefficient (10% level) in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litcoin models. 
Although the logic behind these positive long-run relationships appears 
ambiguous, they totally disappear in short-run, while only Bitcoin model predicts 
a negative estimate that is statistically significant 10% significance. This confirms 
that one could expect a stronger USD against other fiat currencies (including 
cryptocurrencies) when SPP increases. 
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Lastly, error correction terms (ECT) in all models appear statistically 
significant at 1% level with negative sign complying with the ECM theory. Bitcoin 
model seems to be correcting 23.68% of its previous period disequilibrium in the 
way converging its long-run level. This adjustment speed in Etherem, Dash, 
Litcoin, and Monero is 12.76%, 10.20%, 22.91%, and 14.27% respectively. 
 The main limitation of the study is latency (novelty, obscurity, and 
intangibilty) of majority of cryptocurrency related information. This is a brand new 
market and a brand new topic for academic researches. We also believe that if we 
could proxy adaptation of cryptocurrency (legalization of any cryptocurrency as a 
payment tool), we believe it would improve our model further. In addition, few 
cryptocurrencies comprise speculative bubbles, particularly Bitcoin, thus, future 
researches should attempt to measure volume of this bubble addressing to 
question “are we in the peak of Bitcoin bubble?”. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1A. Bitcoin Legality by Country and Classification 
  Name Bitcoin Legality Classification   Name Bitcoin Legality Classification 
1 Afghanistan  Illegal Currency 59 Lebanon  Legal No Information 
2 Aland Islands  Legal Currency 60 Liberland  Legal Currency 
3 Algeria  Illegal Currency 61 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  Legal Money 
4 American Samoa  Restricted Commodity 62 Liechtenstein  Legal Currency 
5 Andorra  Neutral / Alegal No Information 63 Lithuania  Legal Currency 
6 Argentina  Neutral / Alegal Property 64 Luxembourg  Legal Currency 
7 Australia  Legal Currency 65 Malaysia  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 
8 Austria  Legal Currency 66 Maldives  Neutral / Alegal No Information 
9 Azerbaijan  Legal Currency 67 Malta  Legal Currency 
10 Bangladesh  Illegal No Information 68 Mauritius  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 
11 Barbados  Neutral / Alegal No Information 69 Mexico  Restricted Currency 
12 Belarus  Legal No Information 70 Monaco  Legal Currency 
13 Belgium  Legal Currency 71 Mongolia  Legal No Information 
14 Bolivia  Illegal No Information 72 Morocco  Illegal No Information 
15 Brazil  Legal Commodity 73 Nepal  Restricted No Classification 
16 Brunei Darussalam  Legal Currency 74 Netherlands  Legal Commodity 
17 Bulgaria  Legal Currency 75 New Zealand  Legal Commodity 
18 Canada  Legal Barter Good 76 Nicaragua  Legal No Information 
19 Chile  Legal No Information 77 Nigeria  Neutral / Alegal Currency 
20 China  Restricted Commodity 78 Northern Mariana Islands  Legal Commodity 
21 Colombia  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 79 Norway  Legal Commodity 
22 Congo  Legal No Information 80 Pakistan  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 
23 Costa Rica  Legal Currency 81 Paraguay  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 
24 Croatia  Legal Currency 82 Peru  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 
25 Cuba  Legal Currency 83 Philippines  Legal Barter Good 
26 Cyprus  Legal Currency 84 Poland  Legal Property 
27 Czech Republic  Legal Currency 85 Portugal  Legal No Classification 
28 Denmark  Legal Currency 86 Republic of Macedonia  Illegal No Information 
29 Ecuador  Illegal No Information 87 Reunion  Legal Commodity 
30 Egypt  Restricted Commodity 88 Romania  Legal Currency 
31 Estonia  Legal Currency 89 Russian Federation  Illegal Currency 
32 Finland  Legal Currency 90 San Marino  Legal Currency 
33 France  Legal Commodity 91 Saudi Arabia  Restricted No Information 
34 Gabon  Neutral / Alegal No Information 92 Serbia  Legal No Information 
35 Georgia  Legal No Classification 93 Singapore  Legal Currency 
36 Germany  Legal Barter Good 94 Slovakia  Legal Currency 
37 Greece  Legal Currency 95 Slovenia  Legal Currency 
38 Hong Kong  Legal Commodity 96 South Africa  Legal Currency 
39 Hungary  Legal Currency 97 South Korea  Legal No Classification 
40 Iceland  Legal Currency 98 Spain  Legal Currency 
41 India  Neutral / Alegal Commodity 99 Svalbard and Jan Mayen  Legal Commodity 
42 Indonesia  Neutral / Alegal Commodity 100 Sweden  Legal Commodity 
43 Iran  Legal No Classification 101 Switzerland  Legal Currency 
44 Iraq  Legal No Information 102 Taiwan  Legal No Information 
45 Ireland  Legal Currency 103 Thailand  Legal Commodity 
46 Isle of Man  Legal No Information 104 Tunisia  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 
47 Israel  Legal Commodity 105 Turkey  Legal Commodity 
48 Italy  Legal Currency 106 Ukraine  Legal Currency 
49 Japan  Legal Currency 107 United Arab Emirates  Legal Currency 
50 Jersey  Legal Currency 108 United Kingdom  Legal Currency 
51 Jordan  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 109 United States of America  Legal Property 
52 Kazakhstan  Neutral / Alegal Currency 110 Uruguay  Neutral / Alegal Property 
53 Kenya  Neutral / Alegal No Classification 111 Uzbekistan  Legal Currency 
54 Kosovo  Neutral / Alegal No Information 112 Venezuela  Neutral / Alegal Commodity 
55 Kuwait  Legal No Information 113 Viet Nam  Neutral / Alegal Property 
56 Kyrgyzstan  Neutral / Alegal Currency 114 Zambia  Restricted No Information 
57 Latvia  Legal Currency 115 Zimbabwe  Legal Commodity 
